COGNITIVE AND NEUROCOGNITIVE POTENTIALS OF GA'S ACTS FROM THE SCENE OF LANGUAGE ORIGIN

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"Heralding forth a new anthropological dawn"[1] in a series of books, among others, *The Origin of Language* (1981*), *The End of Culture* (1985), *Science and Faith* (1990), *Originary Thinking* (1993), *Signs of Paradox* (1997), *The Scenic Imagination* (2008), *A New Way of Thinking* (2011) and in dozens of articles[2], Eric Gans developed and consolidated a proposal establishing human language along with cultural origins as the main object of his scientific inquiry. The heuristic concept that he proposed is that of a hypothetical *scene of language origin* (repeatedly appearing in all *human scenes* as acts of human presence and representation) that called the linguistic sign into existence. By "originary analysis", as he calls his methodology, Gans exposes to the contemporary world the knowledge of the human condition captured in the form of a universal *scene of language appearance.*

To the simplicity of humanity's communal *scene of language origin,* one could apply an idea of French anthropologist Philppe Descola, speaking about the project of understanding the relations that human beings establish between one another[3]. To this idea, however, we have to add something more:

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[1] This is Marshall Sahlins' formula applied to Philip Descola's work (M. Sahlins, "Foreword" [in]: Philippe Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2013, p. xiv.

[2] See First of all: *Anthropoetics. The Journal of Generative Anthropology.* http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu.

[3] P. Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2013, p. xviii.

intra-human relations conditioned by "the appetite to own the world". Thus the *scene* becomes a means of universal comprehension of interpersonal dependencies occurring in the process of perception and reaction to the complex human reality filled with an infinite number of objects of human desire. This concept, known as Generative Anthropology (GA), has already been mentioned in the pages of this journal[4] and will receive another attempt at interpretation in this article.

It can be surmised that thinking in terms of the *scene* that is the center of GA is alien neither to the philosophers[5] Gans engages nor to anthropologists. For example, Clifford Geertz titling the first chapter of his book, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Autho*r, linked the mode of being of anthropology to the *scene*, to the *scene of writing*[6]. The anthropologist situated in the *scene of writing*, signals the power of the textual turn upon the discipline of anthropology and might be seen as an announcement recognizing the presence of Gans' *scene* in an anthropological as well as ethnographic *ecriture*[7], which transforms itself into an infinite sequence of *scenes*, initiated in the repetitive actions evoking all writing. However, the implications of Geertz's statement as to the recognition of unlimited and uninterrupted continuity of the *scene of writing* reveal the constant existence of an anthropological being but not, however, to the extent of cognizing the multidimensionality of the actions contained therein.

It is Gans' *scene* that provides the justification for all human *scenes,* including anthropological textualizations, and contains, one might argue, acts of human response to entanglement in the world, as expressed in its

[4] See: M. Złocka-Dąbrowska, "GA Among Giants. Gans's Scene of Language and Culture Origin in Reference to Cassirer's and Heidegger's Visions of the Human", *Załącznik Kulturoznawczy*, nr. 7/ 2020, pp. 37-61.

[5] See first of all: E. Gans, *The Origin of Language. A Formal Theory of Representation,* University of California Press, Berkeley- Los Angeles- London 1981, p. XI; Idem, *The Scenic Imagination*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2008; J. Derrida, *Positions,* Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris; J. Barwise, "Scenes and Other Situations." *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 78, no. 7, 1981, pp. 369–97. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/2026481.

[6] Clifford Geertz, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Autho*r, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1988, p. 1.

[7] Cf. Jacques Derrida, L'écriture et la différence, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1967.

central message – the deferral of potential intra-human violence through the emergence of language, thereby recasting Gadamer's famous phrase stating that a human becomes a "being that can be understood"[8]. Since language is scenic, what understanding of the *scene* is to be proposed here?

The *scene* is the fundamental behavioral category of GA[9], says Gans at present. It is both collective and evenemential[10]. Moreover, in one of his latest *Chronicles of Love and Resentment*, Gans maintains that the event of language appearance is the temporal counterpart of the *scene,* which constitutes a series of individual acts experienced as a single action**,** as the working out of a plot, a story, a narration[11]. In our heuristic search, the objective is to look inside to the *scene*; first, to identify categories of acts it contains, and second, to consider what their *fons et origo* is.

What categories of acts might be considered here? We argue that an originary event depicts a situation in which two kinds of acts emerge: sign--making acts and acts of speech, that is the first componential acts of the *scene*, both of the same status but different nature. To discuss their nature, however, let us first recall in a few words the idea of the *scene* we speak about, which necessarily repeats the image of the *scene* presented already in previous publications[12].

The hypothetical *scene,* understood as an *originary event*, is formed by a group of people focused on a central object, usually a hunted animal

[8] Gadamer's original sentence: "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache" (Eng. transl. "Being that can be understood is language"), H.- G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1990, p. 265.

[9] E. Gans, *What is an Event? Chronicles of Love and Resentment*, No. 738, 7th May 2022.

[10] E. Gans, *The Origin of Language. A Formal Theory of Representation,* University of California Press, Berkeley- Los Angeles- London 1981, p. x.

[11] E. Gans, *What is an Event? Chronicles of Love and Resentment*, No. 738, 7th May 2022.

[12] See for example: M. Złocka-Dąbrowska, "GA Among Giants. Gans' Scene of Language and Culture Origin in Reference to Cassirer's and Heidegger's Visions of the Human", *Załącznik Kulturoznawczy*, nr. 7/ 2020, pp. 37-61, DOI 10.21697/zk.2020.7.02; Idem, "Cratos, Crisis and Cognition in Reference to Generative Anthropology and the Scene of Language/Culture Origin", *Res Rhetorica*, 8 (1):137-51. https://doi.org/10.29107/rr2021.1.8.

(though we might imagine other objects positioned at the center), an object of appetitive human interest, tantamount to the desire inherent in the human need to possess and consume the world[13]. The object is initially a victim[14], but one might also think of any other desirable object someone would like to eat or possess. Seeing the object, one member of the group surrounding it makes a gesture of pointing[15], originally, "an aborted gesture of appropriation", whose parallel effect is the emission of a communally mediated sign[16], the object of the hypothesis. This "ostensive" sign appears

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[13] One has to recall here as well that Gans bases his ideas on the mimetic theory of René Girard. The theory is first and foremost a theory of desire and then a theory of conflict, based on the ancient principle of mimesis. The category of mimesis in Girard's view means the primal, imitative, unconscious dynamism of life that enforces human behavior and thinking. The object of desire (1) is desired by the subject (2) in imitation of the desire of the model, the mediator (3). These components form what is known as the mimetic triangle, in which competition for the object of desire leads to violence. Cf. first of all: E. Gans, *Girardian Origins of Generative Anthropology,* The Thiel Foundation "Imitatio", Imitatio / Amazon Digital Services, 2012; Idem, "The Little Bang: The Early Origin of Language", *Anthropoetics. The Journal of Generative Anthropology*, Vol. V, no. 1 Spring/Summer 1999, http://anthropoetics. ucla.edu/category/ap0501/). See also: R. Girard, *Mensonge romantique et vérité Romanesque*, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, Paris 1961, Idem, *Deceit, Desire and the Novel. Self and Other in Literary Structure*, transl. Y. Freccero, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London 1966; Idem, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. Research Undertaken in Collaboration with J.-M. Oughourlian and G. Lefort*, transl. P. Bann, M. Metter, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1987.

[14] The reference point here is for Gans still Girard's mimetic theory*,* in which the victim has a central meaning as a member of the group; but this topic exceeds the problems discussed here. See for example: R. Girard*, La Violence et le sacré,* Éditions Bernard Grasset, *Paris 1972;* Idem*, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde. Recherches avec Jean-Michael Oughourlian et Guy Lefort*, Éditions Bernard Grasset, Paris 1978.

[15] One may interpret Gans' pointing as referring to gestural theories, but only when it is reduced to evolutionary theories of language origin, by eliminating the communal, evenemential, cognitive and causal (deferral of violence) associations of GA.

[16] Let us remember that sign theory has been known in linguistic studies especially with the theory of Ferdinand de Saussure (*Course de linguistique générale*, Lausanne – Paris 1916), but also thanks to Hermann von Helmholtz and his sign

within "a communicative context defined by the presence of interlocutors one to the other", where designation and the communal presence constitute language[17]. The emerged linguistic exchange results in the deferral of violence through representation that constitutes the essence of the human and his *scene*. Let us note, however that the above essential components of the *scene* yet have further contexts.

The aborted gesture initiating the sign manifests *originary thinking* that one might understand as the uniquely human cognitive property, a behavioral effect of human multivalent perception of being that reflects on its own origin. From the *originary scene* humans inherit a set of interdependent properties immanently inscribed in the scenic logic, beginning with the abortive gesture of appropriation which is intensified by the human tendency to imitation and paradoxical mimetic rivalry associated with potential collective violence. What was only an object of appetite before the emission of the sign became an object both resented and desired during and following the emission of the sign. Finally, the emission of the sign results in language, in most general terms, an example of a system of representation. Understanding language, Gans claims, means being able to talk (or write),

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theory of perception. Perception is viewed by von Helmholtz as "unconscious inference", which means that symbols or representations of the physical world might be interpreted and disambiguated through converging evidence from different senses. He argued that many of those inferences are learned rather than innate. It is worth nothing that philosophically, Helmholtz's epistemology commits him to the view that representations arise in a physical process, but signs are not copies of their objects (See: *Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz*, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Connecticut 1971[1878]). Sign theory is also known thanks to the works of Ch. S. Peirce (See for example: *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-1893)*, Vol. 2, ed. by Pierce Edition Project Indiana University Press, Indianapolis 1998).

It should be added that Gans' notion of "sign" repeats de Saussure's terminology, but not its concept. Cf. also: Chapter X: "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", in: J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, transl. A. Bass, The University of Chicago Press 1978, p. 278-294; R. Nycz, „Dekonstrukcjonizm w teorii literatury", *Pamiętnik Literacki: czasopismo kwartalne poświęcone historii i krytyce literatury polskiej*, 77/4, 1986, p.111.

[17]   E. Gans, *The Origin of Language*, op. cit., p. 38.

that is to represent, so it means the act of representation itself[18]. In the *scene*, then, we do not deal with the metaphysical opposition of speech and writing recognized, for example by Jacques Derrida; in Plato's *Phaedrus*[19] or the observation contained in the Latin maxim *Verba volant, scripta manent*; or Ferdinand de Saussure's position seeing speech as merely *origo* and saying at the same time that „*l'objet linguistique n'est pas défini par la combinaison du mot écrit et du mot parlé; ce dernier constitue à lui seul cet objet*". Also, it differs from the conviction of Michael Foucault who proclaimed de Saussure's privileging of *parole* over *langue*[20]. So, what is the *scene of origin*? In the approach presented here, the *scene* is the co-presence of acts of speech and acts of sign, initiated by ostensive signals such as „Ouch!", „Ah!" etc. („cries of pain, surprise and so on"), which Gans considers to be the first words, and which, however, do not remain at the instinctual level, whatever „primitive" their content is[21]. They express intentional understanding of the world. Moreover, Gans takes lexicalization as the determinant of intentionality[22], which – worth highlighting- is the basis of all human actions that make up Gans' *scene*.

In the introduction to John Langshaw Austin's collected works, published in one volume in Poland, titled "*Speaking and Cognizing. Dissertations and philosophical lectures*", one finds a hint that "the philosopher must study language if he is to explore the world"[23], which strengthens the function of GA and encourages us to probe to reach its essence. Gans' research originates from a similar thought, studying the phenomenon of language by touching on the moment of human's first self- expression where the potentials of human mind and matter, the resources of the brain, are closely interrelated. Therefore Gans' concept draws attention to its wide applicability,

[18] E. Gans, *The Origin of Language. A Formal Theory of Representation,* University of California Press, Berkeley- Los Angeles- London 1981, p. 2.

[19] See: J. Derrida, „La Pharmacie de Platon" [in]: *La Dissémination, Editions Du Seuil, Paris 1972.*

[20] A. Barnard, *Antropologia. Zarys teorii i historii,* PIW, Warszawa 2016, p. 193.

[21] See above all: E. Gans, *The Origin of Language,* op. cit., p. 68-98.

[22] Ibidem, p. 74.

[23] B. Chwedończuk, „Wstęp" [in]: J.L. Austin, *Mówienie i poznawanie. Rozprawy i wykłady filozoficzne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1993, p. XLIV.

including an extremely broad cognitive field as well as, more recently, an up-to-date scientific discipline such as neuroscience. Let us suppose that reading "*Originary Thinking*" one might discover new, very interesting issues that have gone unnoticed so far. For Gans, the moment of the appearance of language is the human starting point, and to paraphrase his statement, a delicious surprise at the wealth of knowledge it possesses without having ever been aware of it[24]. It is worth nothing that Gans builds his theory on "the simple equation, where "humanity = language" and "language is an instrument of knowledge (…), the instrument of a self-knowledge crucial to the community in which it was first used".[25] Another equation might be added here namely "language = knowledge" and question: What kind of knowledge is it?

As already stated[26] the GA theory, rich in various constitutive components, opens up a wide area of inquiry, beginning with a quest for those contexts which focus on the emergence of the first sign and speech expressed, respectively, visually or audibly. One of the issues that occupy Gans' attention in „*Originary Thinking*" is Austin's center of interest, namely speech acts, to which Bruce Duncan MacQueen's note might be added, that a person and the right context are required to get the right effect of words. He argues that words alone, even special words, do not suffice. Also, they are not a sufficient condition to fulfill the intent of a speech act[27]. Something more is needed, in particular the fact that speech acts are incorporated units of differentiated interactions.

It is worth noting that since the first half of the twentieth century, language philosophers draw attention to the forgotten fact that speech is

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[24] E. Gans, *Originary Thinking. Elements of Generative Anthropology*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1993, p. 62.

[25] Ibidem, p.2

[26] See especially: M.Złocka-Dąbrowska, *Generative Anthropology in Contexts and Texts*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwerystetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Warszawa 2021, p. 9-41.

[27] B.D. MacQueen, „Neurolingwistyczne podejście do teorii aktów mowy", *Neuropsychologia a humanistyka,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010, p. 181.

a behavioral act[28]. Language – as they argue, though everyone in slightly different terms – originally and essentially is not only a tool for communicating information but also a way to pursue specific intentions. Austin's philosophical studies culminated in the initiation of the so-called ordinary language philosophy[29]. Paradoxically, it was described by Daniel Yeager as "a way of approaching philosophical problems free from philosophical preoccupation"[30], but Austin's theory of speech acts contains suggestions of major importance for GA's perspective. First of all, Austin argues that a speech act is a part of pragmatics where there are certain aims beyond the words or phrases when a speaker says something[31] and that each act of speech, in a certain way, implements some intentions of the sender[32]. Let us not stop at these statements but rather pay attention to the questions Austin raises. Although he is famous for his categorization of speech acts, he called locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary[33], his questions: "What should we say when? and so why and what we should mean by it?[34], or finally: what should we say here?"[35], might be essential. What do these questions convey? Austin's questions contain an internal suggestion, an underlying thought

[28] See: Sh. Edelman, "Language and other complex behaviors: Unifying characteristics, computational models, neural mechanisms", *Language Sciences,* 67, 2017, p. 91-123; *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics,* ed. by J. Searle, F. Kiefer, M. Bierwish, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht- Boston – London 1980.

[29] See especially: J.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address", in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, Vol. 57 (1956-1957), pp. 1-30 (first of all p.7).

[30] D. Yeager, *J.L .Austin and Law. Exculpation and the Explication of Responibility,* Lewisburg Bucknell University Press, 2006 (front cover).

[31] J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words?* The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1962, p. 5.

[32] Ibidem.

[33] See: Sh. Edelman, "Language and other complex behaviours: Unifying characteristics, computational models, neural mechanisms", op. cit., p. 91-123; *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatic,* op. cit.

[34] J.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address", in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, Vol. 57 (1956-1957), p.7; Idem., *How to do Things with Words?* op. cit., p. 7.

[35] J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words?* op. cit., p. 14.

that indicates the expectation of a standard response adapted to the given situation, a situation one might read in the mechanism of Gans' *scene*.

We argue that Austin and Gans bring us closer to the individual human mind, which in turn, directs us to the beginnings of cognitive anthropology in the study of the predetermined knowledge concerning what action would be expected by a community in each situation. It refers to the assumption of the ideational order of culture, built from the basic elements of thought connected to the process of generating and communicating ideas[36] or, according to Ward Goodenough, it represents "what one has to know, or profess to believe, in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members"[37]. To link this statement to the *scene of origin*, we must assume as well that the condition of social acceptance is, among others, to take actions that work in the community's favor.

In view of this, let us pose another question: how this ideational order could be recognized in the *scene of origin*? The requirement of knowledge or existence of a certain belief in order to take actions that meet social expectations is related to the self-knowledge of the human remaining in relationships with others mediated through the desire for objects of the world known from the *scene*. The action emerging in the *scene* and all acts present there constitute the result of the cognitive processes of the human who is "entangled in the *scene*". They result from the knowledge of possible danger of violence the human might unleash in the state of rivalry for the world. To avoid this hypothetical danger caused in the process of rivalry for the central object, humans perform linguistic acts. Therefore, every act bringing to life a sign or speech might be acceptable to its members as a socially expected act, as an act of protection of the community. Accordingly, we argue that Gans' *scene* assumes this ideational order already in the first ostensive signals, the aforementioned "cry of pain", first act of speech, and then the abortive gesture of appropriation that initiates the sign, while both serve as acts of the deferral of violence.

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[36] B. Jonson, "Design Ideation: the conceptual sketch in the digital age". *Design Studies* Vol 26 No 6, 2015, pp. 613–624. doi:10.1016/j.destud.2005.03.001; J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, The Pennsylvania State University, 1999.

[37] W.H. Goodenough, *Culture, Language and Society*, Benjamin/Cummings Pub. Co., Menlo Park CA 1981, p. 109.

In the *scene of origin*, there are many processes that call for explanation. However, it is necessary to make a choice. If we emphasize that knowledge and self-knowledge mentioned above come from human cognitive potentials, we might also ask about the organic bases of this process and turn to unique properties of the human brain, paying attention to Descola's "the physical component of our humanity"[38] and his statement that anthropology of culture should be accompanied by an anthropology of nature[39], which for us also means nature of the human and an attempt to capture the acts of language as a complex human behavior based on cognitive and neuro-cognitive mechanisms that support it.

In the traditional view, we separate what a person does from what a person says. There is a noticeable gulf between words and deeds in almost every language. However, some philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century rather emphasize the forgotten fact that speech is a behavioural act. Alan Gardiner stated that the act of speech is "a highly complex, purposeful mode of human action […] aris[ing] in the intention of some member of the community to influence one or more of his fellows in reference to some particular thing"[40]. Others say that it is "an elaborated action", in which perception, attention, memory and action planning, including pointing, would become tools which exemplify a cognitive process[41]. Betty Birner, in turn, confirms that through speech acts, the speaker conveys physical action[42].

Accordingly, we propose to understand the *scene of origin* as a network of interdependent activities based on a variety of human characteristics: a union of cognitive and physical dimensions especially important in social environments. Let us consider how these networks work. Chris D. Frith

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[38] Cf. P. Descola, *Anthropology of Nature.* Inaugural lecture delivered on Thursday 29 March 2001in Collège de France. https://books.openedition.org/cdf/3631.

[39] See: Idem, *Beyond Nature and Culture*, op. cit., p. xx.

[40] B.D. MacQueen, „Neurolingwistyczne podejście do teorii aktów mowy" [in]: *Neuropsychologia a humanistyka,* ed. by M. Pąchalska, G. Kwiatkowska, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010, p. 179.

[41] *The Sapient Mind, Archaeology meets neuroscience*, Ed. By Colin Renfrew, Chris Firth, Lambros Malafouris, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 153.

[42] See: Betty J. Birner, *Introduction to Pragmatics.* Southern Gate: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2013.

claims, that when a person interacts with the environment, psychologists traditionally start from the input. He clarifies that "Signals arising from the environment impinge upon us. Sensations are detected by our sense organs such as the eyes. The sensations (…) are turned into perceptions (…) on the basis of prior knowledge and current context. Then, decisions are made about what should best be done in response to these perceptions (…). Actions are planned and finally output is initiated in the form of motor movements (…). Within this general framework of stimulus and response, we can have a subset of processes concerned with social stimuli (…), social decisions (…) and social responses"[43]. To the possible actions mentioned by Frith let us add acts of language origin from GA's *scene*.

The *scene of origin* occurs due to human sense organs detecting the central object of appetite, which might be understood as a signal (food, in the primary GA's version)– coming from the environment. Thanks to sensations turned into perception, on the basis of prior knowledge (of danger of violence) and the social context of the situation – what should best be done for society, the process leads to response – decisions and actions in the form of motor movements, in the form of acts of speech and sign. Moreover, the *scene* can be understood as a set of information, including the visual, which is transformed into a sign, as neuroscientists claim[44]. They also say that movement programs are subject to the influence of visual information[45] thanks to the existence of visual-motor neurons.

In conclusion, one more issue remains. We have presented here the *scene of origin* as a network of relations between humans and the world in the light of speech acts and acts of sign production, as an effect of human cognitive potentials linked to certain neurological processes. However, the stock of issues that arise from a closer look at the *scene* itself is much broader. If we were to look for the basic human property which unites these two levels and brings expected scenic effects, it would be the existence of language

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[43] B.D. MacQueen, "Neurolingwistyczne podejście do teorii aktów mowy", op. cit., p. 153–154.

[44] *Neuropsychologia. Współczesne kierunki badań*. ed. by K. Jodzio, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 279.

[45] Piotr Jaśkowski, *Neuronauka poznawcza. Jak mózg tworzy umysł*, Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania w Warszawie, Warszawa 2009, p. 148–149.

whose result, the deferral of intra-human violence, would have to indicate, as already mentioned, intentionality. We mean intentionality as the result of human cognitive potentials and knowledge about the human nature they provide. Gans himself repeatedly draws attention to the issue of intentionality[46]. He assures us that the center of the *scene* – an act of designation – is intentional[47] but higher linguistic forms, nonexistent among animals,[48] might be especially indicative of specifically human intentionality. Also, for Bruce Duncan MacQueen, a neuropsychologist, speech is not "just a thing, not even originally and essentially, a tool for communicating information, but a way to pursue specific intentions"[49]. Gans claims, however, that intention as noninstinctual phenomenon might not be verifiable directly and empirically. Still, in the light of the *scene of origin* discussed above, the intentionality contained in acts present in the *scene* is the result of knowledge of the consequences of choices exhibited in human actions and might be referred to human's drive for survival which is already programmed in the human brain[50]. Therefore, the human's main task would be to continue his scenic existence.

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[46] See for example: E. Gans, *The Origin of Language,* op.cit.,p. 64, 71; Idem, *Science and Faith. The Anthropology of Revelation*, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990, p. 3; Idem, *Originary Thinking. Elements of Generative Anthropology*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993, p. 72.

[47] Ibidem, p. 64.

[48] Ibidem, p. 65.

[49] B.D. MacQueen, "Neurolingwistyczne podejście do teorii aktów mowy", op. cit., p. 182.

[50] E.O. Wilson, *Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge*, op. cit., p. 105. See also: J. Vetulani, *Mózg, fascynacje, problemy, tajemnice,* Wydawnictwo Benedyktynów w Tyńcu, Tyniec 2014.

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Abstract

The objective of the article is to look deeper into the GA's *scene of language origin* in order to identify and discuss its acts together with the whole network of the *scene's* components. Detailed studies of the nature of these acts and their *fons et origo* enable the author to unveil the successive levels justifying their presence and discover their cognitive and neurocognitive potentials. Eventually, they lead to intentionality without which it would be impossible for language to emerge and for humans to achieve a state of deferral of intra-human violence.